Lab Notes

Richard Clarke writes a column for the New York Times called The Security Adviser. Last week's column (which I can't link to because the Times wants money for the article) was about security issues associated with ID cards. In the article, Clarke argues against creating a system of national ID cards, and gives several good reasons:

I'll add another, even better reason not to rely on ID cards as an anti-terrorism tool: they would be ineffective. Even if Clarke's concerns are addressed, an ID card still would only prove identity not intent. If Osama bin Laden walked through airport security with an ID card, he would be promptly arrested. We know who he is and what he has done. The problem is that Osama will not be going through airport security, he'll be sending subordinates with no terrorist history. They'll be let right through — their ID cards will validate, and we'll know who they are but not what they are planning.

I'm not arguing against ID cards, but as the title of this post says, proving identity is just part of the security equation. Before we implement an anti-terrorism ID system we need to address the issues raised by Clarke, and develop a system that can identify terrorist before they board an airplane (or buy a gun, or get a job at a chemical plant). If only that idea was as easy to implement as it was to write. I won't be holding my breath waiting for it.