If the technique proves effective, you'll still need to provide encryption and some higher level form of user authentication as Intel's method proves only location, not identity. However, it's still an interesting new approach.
While this attack troubling, it is both easy to defeat and unlikely to happen in the real world. It's easy to defeat because opaque envelopes — foiled lined ought to do the trick — eliminate the ability to read the envelope's contents without breaking the seal. It's unlikely to happen because of the difficult in ferreting out PIN number mailers from the barrage of innocuous junk mail that banks typically send out (unless, of course, you go through the PIN mail at its source — the office that creates and mails the PINs, but that can be secured separately). For instance, I get a PIN mailed to me once every couple of years, while during that same period get literally hundreds of "time to refinance!" offers from banks.
Silly security: the California Highway Patrol is making the
Geek Squad repaint their
black and white VW Beetle because they "look so much like their patrol cars." A CHP spokesperson said:/div>
If a new driver or an older driver sees this black and white vehicle they might think it's the police — they've got uniforms on and they've got badges on and could be mistaken for an officer.
It would be funny if the CHP hadn't actually issued a ticket to a Geek Squad employee for impersonating an officer.
By Chris on August 26, 2005 9:59 AM
| Permalink
Gmail started out limiting accounts to people who had been invited by other Gmail account holders. Now they've opened up access to everyone (well, everyone in the US for now), but with a twist:
before you can create an account, you must register your cell phone number with Google. After entering your number, Google will send you an SMS message with a number that has to be entered at the Gmail web site to complete the account creation. The apparent idea is to prevent fraudsters from getting anonymous email accounts — at a minimum, Google has a valid cell phone number to verify a user's identity.
By Chris on August 25, 2005 10:35 AM
| Permalink
The way the thief was caught shows that not only is he dishonest, but incompetent as well: as the "head of data security" for the bank, he should have known that he hadn't covered his tracks. The police tracked the break-in back to the unsecured network, and then checked the Wi-Fi access point's logs for a record of the MAC addresses that had recently been connected. The thief's MAC address had been logged, and when the bank checked its records, it discovered that the MAC address corresponded to the laptop that had been issued to the thief.
By Chris on August 24, 2005 9:55 AM
| Permalink
The link whoring in it suggests that I shouldn't give
this article on "The Laws of Identity" much credence, but it's still an interesting read. The most important law of identity is number two ("Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use"), and it's also the reason that the laws are mostly pointless. Yes, organizations should collect only the information they
need, the problem is, there is a lot more information they
want.
The problem with most identity system proposals (including any based on the ideas in the article) is that they aren't designed with the intention of benefiting consumers. The systems are designed to benefit businesses, and then are used to sell the systems to consumers. If Microsoft keeps a file on me, that's to their benefit, not mine. All I get out of the deal is some vague assurances that they'll try not to sell the information identity thieves. My own policy is to not give out any unnecessary information rather than trust a website's promise.
By Chris on August 23, 2005 10:45 AM
| Permalink
By Chris on August 22, 2005 10:49 AM
| Permalink
Back in February,
a Chinese research team reported a practical attack on SHA-1, a significant breakthrough showing weaknesses in the most common internet security protocols (including TLS, the basis for WPA Enterprise security). At this week's Crypto conference, the researchers showed some new improvements in their attack: prior to the February announcement, the best attack was brute force, which took (on average) 2
80 steps. In February, that was reduced to 2
69 steps (each time you knock off a power of 2, the attack is twice as easy). Now, they are reporting they can do it in 2
64 steps — well within the realm of the practical. Expect there to be a lot of work on crypto protocols in the coming months to come up with replacements for SHA-1
By Chris on August 19, 2005 9:56 AM
| Permalink
Apple released an update (Security Update 2005-007 v1.1) to its
update today. They forgot to add 64 bit support, meaning that 64 bit applications failed to work after the update. Most notably,
Mathematica stopped working.
Is it that so few Mac OS X applications are 64 bit that Apple forgot to include support? I discussed
moving Elektron to 64 bits back in February, and concluded that it wasn't possible due to limited system support. Only one system framework is 64 bit (the central framework against which all apps link, System.framework), leaving all subsidiary frameworks 32 bit. This means that until Apple moves forward with making subsidiary frameworks 64 bit (Elektron uses the LDAP, Cocoa, Carbon (yes, both of those last two), DirectoryService, SystemConfiguration, Security, and CoreFoundation frameworks), you won't see many 64 bit applications shipping. As a result, not many people were affected by this bug, but if you were, the fix is available now via Software Update.
By Chris on August 18, 2005 9:50 AM
| Permalink
The University of Oxford has developed a wireless networking system based light transmissions. I'm hardly an expert, but it sounds like they've created a fiber optic system that does away with the fiber. They're pitching it as a security measure — it requires line of sight — but I'm at least as interested in the transmission speed: 155 Mbps.
By Chris on August 17, 2005 11:35 AM
| Permalink
A
follow-up story makes the point about the insidious nature of the ID cards created: they aren't fake IDs, they are real IDs, but fraudulently obtained. That means in the absence of any other information, a check of the ID card would show it as being legitimate. This is one of the tools the 9/11 terrorists used to limit scrutiny of their actions. A number of them were carrying real, albeit fraudulently obtained, Virginia driver's licenses when they boarded their planes. There's no indication that any terrorists obtained IDs from the man arrested in this case, but hopefully his superiors will perform some background checks before hiring his replacement.
By Chris on August 16, 2005 8:54 AM
| Permalink
Apple released
Security Update 2005-007 today. Lots of updates touching on all aspects of the OS — including nasties like a fix for an AppKit bug that allows specially crafted RTF files to execute code. It's available now via Software Update (Apple Menu->System Preferences->Software Update->Check Now).
By Chris on August 15, 2005 3:49 PM
| Permalink
And even worse, the system lets terrorists test the system beforehand. Imagine you're in a terrorist cell. Twelve of you apply for the card, but only four of you get it. Those four not only have a card that lets them go through the easy line at security checkpoints; they also know that they're not on any terrorist watch lists. Which four do you think will be going on the mission? By "pre-approving" trust, you're building a system that is easier to exploit.
By Chris on August 15, 2005 11:30 AM
| Permalink
The best defense against having your files read is to maintain control of your PC, both from a software perspective and retaining physical possession of the hardware. If you must give up control, there are literally dozens of tools available that will securely erase files on your hard drive by overwriting their bits on the disk. I personally use PGP, but the brilliant search engine scientist could have used a search engine to find
a number of others.
By Chris on August 12, 2005 9:37 AM
| Permalink
Hopefully I'm wrong, but it's cases like these that make me think that sometime in the future Wi-Fi network owners could be held liable for the malicious use of their networks. We've seen cases of open Wi-Fi networks being accessed for sending spam, downloading child pornography, and now extortion. Since the actual criminals can be difficult to track down, it wouldn't be surprising to see civil or criminal suits brought against an easier target, the owners of the networks used by criminals. Of course, the easiest way to avoid this is to simply enable WPA Personal on your home network. It's simple, it's secure, and it's supported by most everything out there (OK, not by pre-XP Windows or pre-Panther Mac OS X, but this gives you a good excuse to upgrade!)
Wi-Fi Networking News
By Chris on August 11, 2005 9:35 AM
| Permalink
A company called Sunbelt Software has discovered a
wide-ranging identity theft ring based on the infamous
CoolWebSearch spyware. The program logs keystrokes and uploads the collected information to a public website. The data collected includes credit card numbers, social security numbers, PINs, and passwords. Normal website SSL security was bypassed because the program recorded directly was typed on the keyboard.
Perhaps worst of all, the information was uploaded to a web server where it was left in a public directory accessible to anyone on the internet. By watching the malware's behavior, the researchers were able to find the website address and view some of the purloined personal information. Among the information available was an account number and password usable to access one bank account that contains US$350,000.
Spyware is getting scarier everyday. It is moving from the realm of mere annoyance and is becoming a real threat. Fortunately,
the FBI has responded in this case, and will hopefully be able to arrest and prosecute the offenders.
via Ars Technica
By Chris on August 9, 2005 7:57 PM
| Permalink
As in the Florida case, the man was arrested after complaints from neighborhood residents. And again like the Florida case, it appears the residents were more concerned about a prowler than about Wi-Fi theft.
By Chris on August 8, 2005 9:06 AM
| Permalink
By Chris on August 5, 2005 12:03 PM
| Permalink
By Chris on August 4, 2005 10:02 AM
| Permalink
I'm not sure what the point of this effort was, other than to simply see if it could be done, but a group from Ohio set a
record for the longest unamplified Wi-Fi link at 125 miles. The link required a 12 foot wide satellite dish to achieve, so don't expect to be stuffing this hardware into your laptop bag anytime soon.
By Chris on August 3, 2005 12:05 PM
| Permalink
In case you're wondering, the Javascript command you need is javascript:void(window.g_sDisableWGACheck='all')
By Chris on August 2, 2005 9:30 AM
| Permalink
There's a
discussion on Slashdot about Mac OS X-on-Intel's
use of TCPA DRM, with the usual Slashdot hyperbole about the end of the world when someone mentions "DRM". We don't yet have one of the Mactel developer machines for me to check this out myself, but based on the information circulating around the net, it looks like Apple is using TCPA to lock Mac OS X to Apple hardware. This is hardly surprising, given that most of Apple's revenue derives from hardware sales.
By Chris on August 1, 2005 9:39 AM
| Permalink